What happened
Three women were killed on the same night in one locality in Odisha. The Supreme Court's description of the place matters to everything that follows: cluttered houses, no electricity, a factory nearby that runs with a deafening sound, and residents drawn from the most marginalised sections. The three women lived there in separate houses, and the witnesses were their neighbours. All three had been struck on the face and head with a heavy blunt object, and the post-mortem found they died of internal bleeding and brain injury. The appellant was picked up by the police on suspicion. The investigating officer, who gave evidence as PW13, could not explain to the court how he had reached the appellant or why he arrested him. He did, however, speak of a confession made after the arrest. One of the witnesses to the recovery, PW8, told the court that the police had beaten the accused to extract that confession. The stones and a brick said to have been recovered at the appellant's instance carried no blood — none visible to the investigating officer, and none found by the Forensic Science Laboratory. The trial court rejected the recovery evidence. What was left was the testimony of a single eyewitness, PW3, a neighbour, who said she had watched through a gap in her door at about one in the morning as the appellant struck one of the three women on the head. On that testimony alone, the appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code — note, for one of the three murders, the one PW3 claimed to have seen — and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Then the case effectively stopped. He filed an appeal from prison, the route the law calls a jail appeal, but by the time it was presented it was 3,157 days late. The High Court refused to condone that delay and dismissed the appeal without ever examining whether the conviction was sound. He had already served 12 years at that point. He went on serving. His applications for remission were rejected six times, the last of them on 19 September 2025 — and the record placed before the Supreme Court showed that some of the earlier rejections rested on an apprehension about law and order, because people in the locality were against his release. His jail conduct certificate recorded satisfactory behaviour throughout, good relations with fellow prisoners, and not a single jail offence in all those years. Eventually, with help from the legal services authorities, he reached the Supreme Court. That petition was itself 3,703 days late. A Coordinate Bench condoned the delay in May 2026, called the High Court's order very disturbing, released him on a personal bond of ₹10,000 and directed the District Legal Services Authority at Koraput to prepare a representation seeking remission. By then he had been in prison for 22 years and was 45 years old.
What the court held
The Court decided two distinct things, and both are worth separating because they help different people. The first is about delay. The Court said it was deeply dismayed and equally perturbed by the order that had refused to condone the delay and thrown out the jail appeal unheard. It went further than the usual language about taking a liberal view. Where a convict comes to court in appeal, the judgment says, Constitutional Courts should adopt not a mere liberal approach but a pro-active one to condone delay, however large it is. The reasoning is that what is at stake is liberty — described in the judgment as the most valuable and fundamental of all rights — and that access to justice still eludes the marginalised sections of society, and especially those convicted and imprisoned from among them. The Coordinate Bench that had already condoned the delay put the point in practical terms: the High Court ought to have considered that the man was already 12 years into his sentence, and that this was an appeal through jail, and that this was by itself enough to condone the delay so as to give him one opportunity to argue his appeal on merits. The second is about what it takes to convict on one witness. The Court was careful not to lay down that a single eyewitness can never be enough — that is not the law. Its formulation is that conviction on eyewitness testimony alone is not impermissible, but only where the testimony is believable, credible, consistent with the other circumstances and inspires the confidence of the court, and not where there are serious discrepancies raising a reasonable doubt as to whether the witness saw the incident at all. Applying that, the Court found this testimony shaky and highly improbable. The improbabilities it listed are ordinary, human ones. PW3 said she had to pass the house in front of which two of the bodies were later found in order to reach the house she fled to — yet she saw only one killing, and saw no bodies on the way. She spoke of only one murder, yet a witness who met her at a tea shop the next morning said she had described all three. The woman she fled to never asked why she had arrived in the middle of the night trembling with fear. Nobody in the locality was woken by three killings in one night. No explanation emerged for why the three women were out of their houses at that hour. None of the relatives or co-inhabitants of the deceased were examined, and it was never established that the women lived alone. Around that testimony, the investigation had failed at almost every point: no sketch of a scene where three bodies lay, no account of how the accused came to be arrested, a confession to the police that the Court said definitely cannot be relied upon because it is inadmissible, evidence that it had been beaten out of him, and recovered stones that the witnesses said had been lying near the bodies in plain view rather than being pointed out by the accused. The Court concluded that a serious doubt lingered about the trial court's finding of guilt, set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant. His personal bond was cancelled. It then did something that is worth noticing: it directed the District Legal Services Authority, Koraput, to attempt his rehabilitation or resettlement, with the District Administration headed by the District Collector to assist. The judgment closes by naming the failure as a shared one — a man taken into custody on mere suspicion, a confession extracted by third-degree methods, a trial court that failed to evaluate the evidence properly, and a High Court that remained, in the Court's words, a moot spectator while adding to the tally of disposals. Cumulatively, 22 years erased out of a person's life without any reliable evidence. One more observation, easy to miss and useful to many families, concerns remission. Some of the six refusals had been founded on the apprehension of a law and order situation because local people opposed the release. The Court said that this, in every circumstance, cannot be a reason not to exercise the power of remission judiciously.
The law behind it
This prosecution began more than two decades ago, so the judgment is written in the language of the older codes. Those codes were replaced on 1 July 2024, and cases begun before that date continue under the old law. For anyone reading this today, here is what each provision the Court discussed corresponds to now.
The conviction was under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — punishment for murder. In the new criminal code that is Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the punishment is unchanged: death or imprisonment for life, and fine.
The route the appellant used to file his appeal is the important one here. A prisoner does not need a lawyer at the gate to begin an appeal. Under what is now Section 424 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (previously Section 383 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973), a person who is in jail may hand his petition of appeal and the accompanying copies to the officer in charge of the jail, who is then obliged to forward them to the proper appellate court. That is the jail appeal. The right of appeal against a conviction itself comes from Section 415 of the BNSS (previously Section 374 CrPC) — a person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge, or in any trial where a sentence of more than seven years has been passed, may appeal to the High Court.
The confession the investigating officer relied on was inadmissible. The Court cited Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Today that rule sits in Section 23(1) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence. Section 23(2) adds that a confession made while in police custody cannot be proved either, unless it was made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The narrow exception — the one the old Section 27 dealt with, and which the police invoked here for the stones — is the proviso to Section 23(2): where a fact is actually discovered because of information given by a person in custody, only so much of that information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered may be proved. It is a narrow door, and in this case the Court found the discovery itself did not hold up.
Statements recorded by the police during investigation, referred to in the judgment under Section 161 CrPC, are now governed by Section 180 of the BNSS. These are not substantive evidence; their main use is to show that a witness is now saying something different from what they said earlier, which is exactly how they were used here.
Two further pieces of machinery appear in the judgment. Remission is the reduction of a sentence by the government under its own written policy — it is not a pardon and it does not erase the conviction. And the District Legal Services Authority, which both filed this appeal and has now been told to arrange the appellant's resettlement, exists in every district under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Its help is free.
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What this means for you
If someone in your family is in prison and the appeal was never filed, or was filed years late and thrown out on that ground, this judgment is the most useful thing you can put in front of a court. The single most common way a prisoner's case dies is not a considered ruling that the conviction was correct — it is a limitation bar, an appeal returned unheard because it came too late. The Supreme Court has now said in terms that when a convict knocks at the door of a court, the approach should be not merely liberal but pro-active in condoning delay, however large it is. Twenty-two years and a delay of 3,703 days were condoned here. So the length of the delay is not, by itself, the answer, and an application for condonation is not a formality to be embarrassed about. There is a second, quieter point for anyone whose relative is inside without a lawyer. The appeal in this case was filed from prison and taken up by the legal services authorities. A prisoner can start an appeal by handing the papers to the officer in charge of the jail; that officer must forward them. Nobody has to be able to afford an advocate first. If you are following a trial, the part about evidence is worth understanding properly. A conviction can rest on one eyewitness — the Court did not say otherwise, and it is important not to walk away believing it did. What it said is that where the single account contains serious discrepancies of the everyday kind, it cannot carry a conviction on its own. The discrepancies that mattered here were not technical: a route that could not have been walked without seeing two bodies, an account that grew from one murder to three by the next morning, a neighbourhood that nobody says woke up. Alongside that, remember that a confession made to a police officer is not evidence against you and cannot be proved in court, whatever you are told at the time, and that a recovery is only useful to the prosecution if something was genuinely discovered because of what the accused said. Finally, on remission. If early release has been refused because of local opposition or a general worry about law and order, this judgment says that cannot in every circumstance be a reason to withhold a judicious decision. That is now something a representation can quote. One honest caveat. An acquittal on reasonable doubt is a finding that the prosecution did not prove its case — here the Court said the prosecution left a lot to be desired and a serious doubt lingered. And notice what this judgment could not do. It could not give back 22 years. What it could do was direct the District Legal Services Authority and the District Collector to help the man rebuild a life, which is the Court acknowledging that an acquittal by itself is not a remedy.
What to do
Start with the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) in the district where the person is imprisoned, or where the trial court sits. It is free, you do not have to prove you cannot afford a lawyer to be heard, and every district has one, usually at the district court complex. The DLSA is what carried this appeal. If no appeal was ever filed, know that it can still be started from inside. The prisoner hands the petition of appeal and copies to the officer in charge of the jail, who must forward them to the appellate court — that is the jail appeal route, and it does not depend on a family outside having arranged anything. If an appeal was dismissed only because of delay, that is not the end of it. Ask the DLSA or your advocate about an application for condonation of delay, and cite this judgment: Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 INSC 802, decided 4 August 2026, where a delay of 3,703 days was condoned and the Supreme Court criticised the High Court for refusing to condone 3,157. Put the practical facts in the application — how long the person has already served, that the appeal came from jail, and that no court has yet looked at the merits. Those were the exact facts the Court said should have been enough. Collect the papers that make the argument concrete: the trial court judgment, the conviction and sentence order, the jail conduct certificate, any medical records, and the record of every remission application and its refusal. The conduct certificate did real work in this case. On remission, apply through the jail authorities and keep every refusal in writing. If a refusal rests on local opposition or a general law and order apprehension, that is now specifically answerable with this judgment. Ask the DLSA to prepare the representation — that is what the Court directed be done here. A note on timing if someone is acquitted: ask the DLSA about rehabilitation and resettlement support, and about compensation. The Supreme Court directed the DLSA and the District Administration to attempt resettlement in this case, so there is a precedent to point at rather than only a request to make. Use NyaySahay to understand the terms and prepare your questions, but for anything to do with a prisoner, deal with the DLSA directly. It costs nothing and it is the body the courts themselves rely on.
Source
Supreme Court of India, Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, 4 August 2026. Citation: 2026 INSC 802. Read the full judgment .
This explainer was written from the primary judgment text, not from news reports.